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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JOHN HOLDEN, : Case No. 970236-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of controlled substances, 
methamphetamine, an enhanced second degree felony, and marijuana, an enhanced third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (2)(d) and (2)(e) (1996 
& Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his front yard, an area open to public view? 
A defendant's subjective expectation of privacy will be deemed legitimate 
only if it is one that society recognizes as reasonable. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)). Accordingly, 
appellate review of a trial court's determination as to whether a defendant has a 
constitutionally protected expectation of privacy is a two-step process. First, the trial 
court's determination as to whether the defendant has demonstrated a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the area searched is a factual determination that is reviewed for 
clear error. Taylor, 818 P.2d at 565. Second, the trial court's determination whether 
society is willing to recognize the individual's expectation of privacy as legitimate is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard, but is only necessary where the first 
inquiry is satisfied. Id. 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the warrantless search of 
defendant's curbside garbage was constitutionally reasonable? 
Because defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise his claims 
below, and does not argue any exception to the preservation requirement on appeal, his 
claims are not subject to review under any standard. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 
1144-45 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus dismissed, 1997 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah 1997); State 
v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
3. Did the trial court properly find that police acted in good faith when 
they disposed of defendant's trash? 
A trial court's determination of no bad faith, or of good faith, is subject to a 
clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909 
2 
(10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir.), r'hg, en banc, denied, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20702 (8th Cir. Aug. 15, 1996); United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 
399,403 (D.C. Cir. 1991); People v. Memro, 905 P.2d 1305,1326 (Cal), cert denied, 
117 S.Ct. 106 (1996). The party challenging a trial court's factual finding must marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the ruling and demonstrate that even viewed in the light 
most favorable to the ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support it. State v. Drobel, 
815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, an enhanced 
second degree felony, and marijuana, an enhanced third degree felony, in violation of 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (2)(d) and (2)(e) (1996 and Supp. 1996)1 (R. 242-
41).2 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a video surveillance 
of his residence, from a warrantless search of garbage bags left at his curb, and from a 
warrant-supported search of his residence (R. 131-115), a copy of the suppression motion 
is reproduced in addendum A. The State filed a response in objection to the motion to 
suppress (R. 144-138), and the trial court subsequently denied the motion (R. 137-134), a 
copy of the trial court's ruling is reproduced in addendum B. 
Defendant sought and was denied interlocutory review of the matter (R. 
156). Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his garbage bags 
and/or to dismiss the drug charges under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), 
based on the State's failure to preserve "potentially useful" evidence seized from his 
garbage (R. 165-161), a copy of the Youngblood motion is reproduced in addendum C. 
Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 314-356), the trial court denied defendant's 
Youngbloo d motion (R. 356-364), a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is reproduced in 
addendum D. 
1
 The charging information inadvertently cites subsections 58-37-8(5) and 
(9), as the basis for the enhanced charges. However, as stated in the information (R. 240-
41), the instant charges were enhanced based solely on defendant's prior drug 
convictions. The applicable enhancing subsections are therefore 58-37-8(2)(d) and (2)(e). 
2
 The pleadings file has been numbered in the record on appeal in reverse 
chronological order. 
4 
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of no contest to the 
charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress and/or to 
dismiss the charges (R. 240-231). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 1-15 years for the 
second degree felony and 0-5 years for the third degree felony, which terms were to be 
consecutive to any sentence defendant was then serving (R. 251). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
Complaints About Drug Trafficking at Defendant's Residence. Defendant 
resides at 492 East 400 South in Vernal, Utah (R. 266). Howard Weisman is defendant's 
neighbor to the north (R. 290) and has observed "the traffic of people going in and out 
constantly" from defendant's residence (Id.). Concerned that defendant was involved in 
drug trafficking in his neighborhood, Mr. Wiseman complained several times to the 
Vernal Police Department (Id.). 
Surreptitious Video Surveillance of Defendant's Front Yard. Pursuant to 
Mr. Wiseman's complaints, and with his consent, officers Lewis and Park installed a 
video camera in the Wiseman residence in order to surreptitiously surveil the exterior of 
defendant's residence (Id.). The camera was set up at 1:00 p.m. on 20 October 1995 and 
was in continuous operation from that time until 6:45 p.m. on 22 October 1995 (R. 267, 
3
 The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's rulings. See, 
e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995). 
5 
290, 292). The resultant 52 hour video recording shows 52 vehicles arriving at, and 
quickly departing from defendant's residence, as well as a high volume of pedestrian 
traffic (R. 267). 
Drugs and Paraphernalia Seized From Garbage Left at Defendant's 
Curb. When Officers Lewis and Park returned to remove the camera on 22 October 
1995, they saw defendant "take some garbage out of the back of his vehicle and place it 
out on the curb in front of his house" (R. 267-68). Specifically, the bags were placed on 
the edge of the road pavement, within one foot of the street, "so the garbage man would 
know to pick [them] up" (R. 297). The officers did not seize the garbage at this time, but 
returned at 10:20 p.m. that same evening (R. 270). At that time, they seized one large 
dark green trash bag, a couple of similar smaller bags, and some boxes of loose garbage 
which they took to the police department and searched (Id,). 
In the large trash bag the officers uncovered four used syringes, three straw 
portions with drug residue, nine plastic bindle portions, four plastic baggies with squares 
that had been cut out of them, one package of zig-zag papers, one paper bindle with drug 
residue, one plastic baggy with drug residue, and two syringe packages with receipts of 
purchase (R. 271). One of the small trash bags contained six straw portions, five plastic 
bindle portions, three straw portions with residue, three used syringes, and two zip-loc 
baggies with squares cut out of them (Id.). The officers also found mail addressed to 
defendant at the residence (Id.) 
6 
Search Warrant for Defendant's Residence Sought and Executed. Based 
in part on the above evidence, the officers sought and obtained a warrant to search 
defendant's residence (R. 277), for controlled substances, paraphernalia and documents 
tending to show possible distribution connections and/or profits from defendant's drug 
trafficking (R. 21). In addition to information gleaned from Mr. Wiseman, the video 
surveillance of defendant's residence, and the warrantless search of his garbage, the 
search affidavit set forth information gleaned from one confidential informant who made 
a controlled buy from defendant at his residence, and another confidential 
informant/neighbor who had observed the large volume of traffic to and from 
defendant's residence (R. 16-15). The affidavit also contained defendant's criminal 
history, showing that he was convicted for a felony drug offense in 1993, and was also 
arrested for possession of paraphernalia in 1994 (R. 14). 
The warrant-supported search of defendant's residence turned up various 
and assorted paraphernalia with and without residue, marijuana seeds and stems and 
Ceftin and Nitroglycerin pills (R. 23-22). 
Motion to Suppress Denied. Defendant moved to suppress the video 
surveillance of his residence, the contraband discovered in the warrantless search of his 
garbage, as well as the contraband uncovered in the warrant-supported search of his 
residence (R. 131). Defendant claimed that the above evidence was obtained in violation 
of his federal and state constitutional rights (R. 131-130), see addendum A. 
7 
The trial court denied defendant's motion in a written ruling. In regards to 
the video surveillance of defendant's residence, the trial court ruled that defendant had 
"no reasonable expectation of privacy which would require a warrant"; that case authority 
cited by defendant was distinguishable because it dealt with situations where the video 
recording was of an area closed to the public; that police in this case "merely recorded on 
tape what was open to the public view"; that police "had a right to be in the place where 
the camera was set up"; that police "could have stationed an officer at that location"; that 
the fact that a video recorder was used instead of an officer had "no constitutional 
significance"; that the use of the video recorder merely relieved police from the 
"substantial time commitment" which would have otherwise been required; and that 
"[t]he constitution does not protect as private what a citizen knowingly opens to public 
view" (R. 137-13 6), see addendum B. 
Concerning the propriety of the warrantless seizure of defendant's garbage, 
the trial court ruled that defendant had made "[n]o attempt" to "specifically examine" the 
state constitution and demonstrate why it should be read "more broadly" than the federal 
constitution; that "absent this type inquiry," the trial court would not rule that the state 
constitution was broader than its federal counterpart; that California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35 (1988), was therefore controlling authority; and that Greenwood applies to a 
narrow area of law, is clear and easily applied (R. 136-35), see addendum B. 
Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
8 
Arizona v. Youngblood Motion denied. Following the denial of his motion 
to suppress, defendant sought and was denied interlocutory review (R. 156). Thereafter, 
defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his garbage and/or to dismiss 
the charges under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), asserting that the State had 
failed to preserve "potentially useful" evidence seized from his garbage (R. 165-161), see 
addendum C. The State responded in a written objection that it was defendant's burden to 
establish that the discarded trash was "potentially useful", or that its exculpatory value 
was apparent before its destruction, and that defendant had not met that burden (R. 207). 
Indeed, the discarded trash, in particular, the envelope addressed to defendant, was 
inculpatory (R. 210). Even assuming the trash constituted exculpatory evidence, 
defendant could not show that it was discarded in bad faith (R. 207). 
An evidentiary hearing on the matter was held 14 March 1997 (R. 218-17). 
Officer Lewis stated that in sorting through defendant's trash, the officers focused on 
evidence of his drug activity: "what was trash was put in the trash, what was evidence or 
used in narcotic activity was set to the side" (R. 327). The items thrown away included 
empty canned goods, paper towels, food and at least one envelope addressed to defendant 
at his Vernal residence (R. 331-334, 346). 
It was further adduced that the Vernal Police Department's policy and 
procedures manual did not specifically address garbage searches (R. 339). However, in 
9 
executing search warrants, officers typically go through garbage cans seizing evidence of 
narcotic activity, and discarding the trash therein (Id). 
Based on the above, the trial court denied defendant's Youngblood motion, 
finding, in pertinent part, that defendant's garbage bags were searched at the Vernal 
Police Department from approximately 10:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. on 23 October 19954; 
that the two garbage bags searched were larger kitchen type bags; that the officers 
searched for evidence of narcotic activity; that the officers separated out items having 
evidentiary value from those items lacking evidentiary value; that the officers took into 
custody used syringes, straw portions, used bindles, used baggies, rolling paper, and 
packaging for syringes; that items thrown away included empty cans, towels, food, two 
envelopes addressed to defendant and the bags themselves; that there was nothing in the 
garbage bags which would identify anyone other than defendant; that the trash was wet, 
"stinky", and had food on it; that the officers each made their own independent decision 
as to what had evidentiary value and what did not; that there is no policy or procedure 
that would have assisted the officers; that no exculpatory evidence was found; that the 
mere possibility that lost or destroyed evidence could be exculpatory was not sufficient to 
satisfy defendant's burden; that discarding the envelopes addressed to defendant was 
4
 The trial court's reference to 23 October 1995 as the date the garbage bags 
were seized is inadvertent. The Officer Lewis's undisputed testimony was that the bags 
were seized the same evening that the video equipment was removed from the Wiseman 
residence, 22 October 1995 (R. 321). 
10 
arguably negligent, but did not even approach bad faith; that there was no indication that 
the envelopes would have played a significant role in defendant's defense; that the 
envelopes would have been helpful to the prosecution; and that defendant failed to 
adequately raise any state constitutional claim (R. 356-64), see addendum D. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The video camera surveillance of defendant's front yard, an area that is 
undisputedly open to public view, triggered no Fourth Amendment protection. Defendant 
failed to preserve the argument that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
being surveilled from his neighbor's property; moreover, he lacks standing to assert the 
neighbor's privacy rights. 
POINT II 
Because the open view video surveillance of defendant's yard triggered no 
Fourth Amendment Protection, it also did not taint the subsequent seizure of defendant's 
curbside garbage. The seizure of defendant's garbage was proper under both California 
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), and State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, P.2d (Utah August 27,1997). Defendant's arguments in attempt to 
distinguish this dispositive authority are waived. 
11 
POINT HI 
The trial court found that police acted in good faith in disposing of 
defendant's garbage, or those items therein that were unrelated to his narcotic activity. 
Defendant fails to marshal the supporting evidence and to demonstrate any clear error in 
the trial court's factual determination. Absent a showing of bad faith, defendant cannot 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE SURREPTITIOUS VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S FRONT YARD, AN AREA EXPOSED 
TO PUBLIC VIEW, DID NOT CONSTITUTE A 
SEARCH FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSES5 
A. Open View Observations Trigger No Constitutional Protection 
"It has long been the law that objects falling within the plain view of an 
officer from a position where he is entitled to be are not the subject of an unlawful 
search." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1057 (1981). Here, 
5
 Defendant nominally referred to the state constitution below and again on 
appeal. His nominal reliance is insufficient to have preserved any issue of state 
constitutional law for review on appeal. See State v. Lqfferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988), cert denied sub nom., Cook v. Lafferty, 504 U.S. 911 (1992) (declining to 
reach state constitutional claims when a party relies on parallel federal constitutional 
provisions and relies only nominally on the state constitution). 
12 
based on complaints from defendant's neighbor, that defendant was engaged in drug 
trafficking, Officers Lewis and Park set up a video surveillance of the vehicle and 
pedestrian traffic to and from the front of defendant's residence (R. 290). The video 
camera was set up inside the complaining neighbor's home, and with his consent (Id). 
Because the officers installed the camera in a place where they were lawfully entitled to 
be, and because the pedestrian and vehicle traffic to and from defendant's yard fell within 
the plain view of the officers and/or the video camera, the trial court correctly ruled that 
the surreptitious video surveillance did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the 
resultant videotape evidence need not, therefore, be suppressed (R. 136), see addendum 
B. 
B. No Dispute That Defendant's Front Yard was Open To Public 
View 
Defendant cannot assail the trial court's ruling without establishing that the 
video surveillance of his front yard triggered Fourth Amendment protections. In 
challenging the trial court's ruling, defendant cites case law that is distinguishable on the 
ground cited by the trial court: "[it] relatefs] to situations where the [video surveillance 
was] of areas that were not open to the public" (R. 137). See, e.g., United States v. 
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his backyard where defendant had erected fences around his 
yard, screening the activity within from casual observers, and the area monitored also fell 
13 
within the curtilage of defendant's home); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 
(10th Cir. 1990) (upholding order authorizing video surveillance via closed circuit 
television installed by surreptitious entry and finding that defendant's had an expectation 
of privacy in business/warehouse where windows had been taped over and no signs 
invited public traffic). Defendant does not dispute that his front yard was open to public 
view. Br. of Aplt. at 8-15. His reliance on the above authority is therefore misplaced. 
The trial court's ruling, on the other hand, that defendant had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his front yard (R. 136), see addendum B, is both sound and well supported. 
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes 
to the public, even in his own home, or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection"). Accord State v. Pontier, 518 P.2d 969, 973 (Id. 1974) (finding it 
foreseeable "that a reasonably curious neighbor, while working in his yard, might look 
over the picket fence into [defendant's] yard and see the [marijuana plants]"); State v. 
Nason, 498 A.2d 252, 255 (Me. 1985) (holding that "defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in activities that were exposed to the public outside her house"). 
See also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 2.3(g) p. 512-13 and n.216 (collecting cases 
and concluding that "no justified" expectation of privacy is present "when the physical 
facts are such that the incriminating objects or activities [are] readily visible to persons on 
neighboring lands"). 
14 
C. Waiver and No Standing to Vicariously Assert Neighbor's Fourth 
Amendment Rights 
Defendant further asserts that because his neighbor's home was not a public 
area, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy against being surveilled from that 
location. Br. of Aplt. at 13. In so arguing, defendant necessarily, implicitly presumes 
that he can vicariously assert his neighbor's Fourth Amendment rights. This was not an 
argument which defendant specifically and particularly asserted in the trial court, and he 
argues no exception to the preservation requirement on appeal. The argument is therefore 
not subject to review under any standard. State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 
(Utah 1989) (requiring "some form of specific preservation of claims of error [below] 
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal"), habeas corpus dismissed, 
1997 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah 1997); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) 
(where appellant does not argue that "exceptional circumstances" or "plain error" justifies 
review of an unpreserved issue, the reviewing court will decline to consider it on appeal). 
To the extent his claim may be deemed preserved, defendant simply lacks 
standing to contest the constitutionality of law enforcement's consensual presence in his 
neighbor's home. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 83-84 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that 
defendant could not vicariously assert his codefendant's Fourth Amendment rights), 
habeas corpus denied, Webb v. Van Der Veur, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah App.), cert denied, 
860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
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Defendant's meritless claims fail to demonstrate any error in the trial 
court's refusal to suppress the videotape evidence. This Court should so hold. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S 
GARBAGE, LEFT FOR CURBSIDE COLLECTION, 
WAS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER CALIFORNIA V. 
GREENWOOD 
A. The Open View Video Surveillance of Defendant's Front Yard Did 
Not Taint the Subsequent Warrantless Search of Defendant's 
Curbside Garbage 
In Point 11(A) of his brief, defendant asserts that the surreptitious video 
surveillance of his front yard was unconstitutional and therefore tainted the subsequent 
warrantless search of his garbage, rendering the evidence seized therefrom, inadmissible 
fruit of the poisonous tree under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) and progeny. 
Br. of Aplt. at 16-18. However, as set forth in Point I, supra, defendant fails to 
demonstrate any illegality in the surreptitious, open view video surveillance of his front 
yard. Therefore, the benign surveillance could not and did not taint the officer's further 
conduct in searching defendant's curbside garbage, and there is no necessity for the State, 
or for the Court, to engage in an Arroyo analysis. 
B. Waiver 
In Point 11(B) of his brief, defendant acknowledges that California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), controls the federal constitutional analysis of the 
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warrantless search of his garbage. Br. of Aplt. at 19. In Greenwood, the United States 
Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in household 
garbage that is left curbside for pickup by sanitation workers. 486 U.S. at 40-41. Accord 
State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 549-50 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, P.2d 
(Utah August 27,1997). However, defendant asserts that the trial court wrongly applied 
Greenwood to the instant facts because "police had no clear indication beforehand that 
the bags contained garbage"; and because "police never knew the origin of the bags, for 
example, if they came from defendant's house, another person's house, or some 
completely different place." Br. of Aplt. at 19. 
Significantly, defendant made no attempt to so distinguish Greenwood in 
the trial court (R. 131-115), see addendum A. Instead, defendant nominally relied on the 
state constitution, requesting the trial court to find that he was afforded greater protection 
thereunder (Id.). The trial court rejected defendant's nominal request, expressly finding 
that defendant made "[n]o attempt" to "specifically examine" the state constitution and 
"provide a basis as to why the Utah Constitution should be read more broadly[,]" than its 
federal counterpart (R. 135), see addendum B. The trial court further ruled that "[a]bsent 
this type of inquiry," he was "not persuaded to rule that [the Utah Constitution] is broader 
than the Federal Constitution" (Id.). 
Based on the above, defendant failed to specifically and particularly raise 
below the federal and state constitutional claims he makes on appeal, that Greenwood is 
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distinguishable, and that article I, section 14 should be interpreted more broadly than the 
Fourth Amendment. Br. of Aplt. at 19-22. Rather, these claims are raised for the first 
time in his brief on appeal. Because defendant argues no exception to the preservation 
requirement, these arguments are not subject to review under any standard. State v. 
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus dismissed, 1997 Utah 
LEXIS 86 (Utah 1997); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Notably, defendant's arguments in favor of greater state constitutional 
protection are identical to those recently and soundly rejected by this Court in Jackson, 
937 P.2d at 549-50 (declining "to read article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution as 
providing greater protection to residential garbage placed on the street for collection than 
would be available under the federal Fourth Amendment9'). 
Defendant fails to demonstrate any constitutional infirmity in the 
warrantless search of his curbside garbage. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling admitting 
the evidence seized should be upheld. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
POLICE MANIFEST NO BAD FAITH IN DISPOSING 
OF TRASH UNRELATED TO DEFENDANT'S 
NARCOTIC ACTIVITY 
In searching defendant's garbage for evidence of his narcotic activities, 
police retained used syringes, straw portions, used bindles, used baggies, rolling paper, 
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and packaging for syringes (R. 357-358), see addendum D. They discarded empty food 
cans, towels, food, two envelopes addressed to defendant and the garbage bags 
themselves (R. 358), see addendum D. Defense counsel conceded below that there was 
no evidence that the "actions of the police department were 'malicious' or consciously 
prejudicial" in so doing (R. 352). The trial court accordingly found no bad faith in the 
decision to discard this trash which was unrelated to defendant's narcotic activity (R. 361-
64), see addendum D. 
On appeal, defendant nonetheless claims that the police' failure to make an 
itemized list of, and to photograph his trash before disposing of it constituted a bad faith 
failure to preserve "potentially useful" evidence in violation of his federal and state due 
process rights.6 Br. of Aplt. at 24,26. Defendant's claim is meritless. 
A. Defendant's Burden to Show Bad Faith 
It is defendant's burden to show that police acted in bad faith when they 
failed to preserve his trash. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). Short of this 
showing, defendant cannot prevail on his claimed due process violation. Id. ("[U]nless a 
6
 The trial court found that defendant failed to adequately raise a separate 
state constitutional claim in that court (R. 349 and R. 364), see addendum D. On appeal, 
defendant again fails to offer any state constitutional analysis and cites no cases invoking 
the Utah Constitution. Defendant's nominal reliance on the state constitution is 
insufficient to have preserved any issue of state constitutional law for review on appeal. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1247 n.5. 
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criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."). 
B. Defendant Fails to Marshal Evidence Supporting Trial Court's 
Ruling That Police Exhibited No Bad Faith 
A trial court's determination of no bad faith, or of good faith, is a factual 
determination, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., United States 
v. BohU 25 F.3d 904, 909 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502, 504 (8th 
Cir. 1996), r'hg, en banc, denied, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20702 (8th Cir. Aug. 15, 1996); 
United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399,403 (D.C. Cir. 1991); People v. Memro, 905 P.2d 
1305, 1326 (Cal. 1996), cert denied, 117 S.Ct. 106 (1996). As the party challenging the 
trial court's factual finding here, it is defendant's burden to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the ruling and to demonstrate that even viewed in the light most favorable to 
the ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support it. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 
(Utah App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). Defendant does not even 
acknowledge, let alone attempt to meet his marshaling burden. Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. 
Rather, defendant reargues the evidence favorable to his claim, wholly ignoring the 
evidence supporting the trial court ruling and the reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. 
His argument should be rejected on this ground. 
Moreover, the trial court's ruling is supportable in the record. Police 
contravened no written or known policy on garbage searches; indeed this was the first 
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search of curbside garbage that the officers had conducted (R. 358-359, 36U62),see 
addendum D. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 (observing that evidence that police 
conduct was consistent with normal practice was inconsistent with their claimed bad 
faith). 
C. Defendant Conceded Lack of Police Bad Faith Below 
More importantly, defendant conceded below that police did not view the 
trash as exculpatory evidence when they disposed of it (R. 352). See Youngblood, 488 
U.S. at 56-57 (stating that, "[t]he presence or absence of bad faith by the police for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of 
the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed"). Nor is it. The 
most that can be said, is that police were arguably negligent in discarding mail addressed 
to defendant; however, as found by the trial court, the mail was inculpatory, not 
exculpatory (R. 364), see addendum D. Defendant persists that the mail may have been 
dated and that this would have been helpful in refuting his possession charge. In light of 
his recent observed possession of the garbage bags themselves, his claim lends neglible, if 
any, exculpatory weight to the discarded mail. 
Defendant establishes no clear error in the trial court's well-supported 
finding that police disposed of his trash in good faith. His due process claim should 
therefore be rejected. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ^ October 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE 
AND ALL DERIVATIVE 
EVIDENCE 




The Defendant, by counsel, respectfully moves the Court to 
suppress the following evidence in this matter: (1) all evidence 
obtained from police videotape surveillance of the Defendant's home 
from October 20 to October 22, 1995, (2) all evidence found in two 
garbage bags which police confiscated from the Defendant's property 
on October 22, 1995, and (3) all evidence found from a search of 
the Defendant's home on October 23, 1995. This motion is made on 
grounds that police videotaping violated the Defendant's rights 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, that confiscation 
of the garbage bags • violated the Defendant's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and search of the Defendant's 
1 
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home and seizure of evidence from it violated the Defendant's 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
This motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Suppress Videotape Evidence and All Derivative 
Evidence. 
us ^ DATED thi ^ day of September 1996. 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On this day of September, 1996 I caused to be delivered 
a true and correct copy of this document to: 
JoAnn B. Stringhara 
Uintah County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT* 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE 
AND ALL DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE 
fl? OF/ «fr 
Case No. 951800369 PS 
Judge Payne 
The Defendant, by counsel/ respectfully submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Videotape Evidence and 
All Derivative Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 1 p.m. on October 20f 1995/ while investigating the 
Defendant/ members of the Vernal City Police Department installed 
a time lapse video recorder in a citizen's home across the street 
from the Defendant's homef so that police surreptitiously could 
record the activities of the Defendant and anyone visiting him. 
The video recorder was unattended/ except for two checks by police 
to make sure that it was operating correctly. Recording lasted a 
total of fifty-two hoursf until 6:45 p.m. on October 22# 1995/ when 
police arrived at the citizen's home to remove their equipment. 
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The Vernal City Police Department neither applied for nor 
received a court order authorizing installation of the video 
recorder. 
In the course of removing their equipment, while in the 
citizen's home, police observed the Defendant exit his home, take 
two opague, dark green garbage bags out of a pickup truck on his 
property, and place the bags west of his driveway near the street. 
At 10:20 p.m., that same night, police returned, confiscated the 
bags and inventoried contents at the police station. On the basis 
of the contents, police obtained a search warrant the next day, 
October 23, 1995, to search the Defendant's home, and promptly 
executed it. Various items inside the home were seized. Also on 
October 23, 1995 the Defendant was arrested. 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether police violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights by using a video recorder to observe the activities of the 
Defendant and visitors at his home, without first obtaining court 
authorization, appears to be an issue of first impression in Utah. 
The issue, however, has been thoroughly discussed and analyzed by 
federal appeals courts during the past ten years. This is 
understandable, as the federal government has made aggressive use 
of surreptitious videotaping in criminal investigations and 
prosecutions, in particular in cases involving drugs. Questions 
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naturally have arisen about the constitutional dimensions of such 
governmental activity* 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACTION OF THE VERNAL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
IN PLACING A VIDEO RECORDER IN A POSITION THAT 
ALLOWED POLICE TO RECORD ALL ACTIVITY IN THE 
DEFENDANTS YARD CONSTITUTED A SEARCH UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ENTITLED THE DEFENDANT 
TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION. 
It is extraordinary that the Vernal City Police Department did 
not apply to Eighth District Court for authorization to install and 
use a video recorder in this case. Perhaps police never have done 
so. Perhaps they felt no need since activities in the Defendant's 
yard were visible even to a casual observer. The United States 
Department of Justice made the latter argument in United States v. 
Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) , a case factually 
similar to this one. Cuevas was suspected of drug trafficking. 
Federal agents, to obtain evidence, installed a video camera on a 
power pole overlooking a ten-foot-high fence on the north side of 
Cuevas1 property. The government argued, however, that agents did 
not need a court order to install the camera since activity in the 
driveways and on the southwestern portion of the property was 
visible from the street, some activity in the rear portion was 
visible from the street, and a fence on the east side was only five 
or six feet high, allowing a person of average height to see into 
the yard. Cuevas-Sanchez at 250. (The court also noted that only 
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a chain link fence bordered the east side of the property. Ij3. at 
n. 1. There appears not to have been a fence of any kind on the 
south side, which the home fronted on.) 
The federal government, in Cuevas, did apply for and obtain 
court authorization to install the video camera; it merely argued, 
initially, that authorization was unnecessary. The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument. The court called 
videotaping of the type the government engaged in "a potentially 
indiscriminate and most intrusive method of surveillance." Id^ . at 
250. It compared the videotaping to the kind of surveillance of 
citizens described in George Orwell's novel 1984. Id. at 251. It 
said that the area monitored by the camera fell within the 
curtilage of the Defendant's home, "an area protected by tra-
ditional fourth amendment analysis.* IQ. There was no doubt in 
the court's mind that the government's action constituted a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Cuevas was entitled 
to judicial protection. Id. 
The main issue in Cuevas was whether the federal govenment met 
legal requirements for issuance of a court order for installation 
and use of a video camera to observe the defendant's home and his 
activities. The issue never was whether the government needed a 
court order (though the government, as indicated, argued the point 
as a preliminary matter). Federal cases prior to Cuevas required 
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a showing to a court that installation of cameras in criminal 
investigations met certain constitutional standards, as a condition 
for court authorization. United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 
(2d Cir. 1986)
 # cert, denied, 479 U.S. 827, 107 S.Ct. 104, 93 
L.Ed.2d 54 (1986) and United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 885 (7th 
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 1853, 85 L.Ed.2d 
150 (1985). A fairly recent case has reiterated that evidence from 
a camera installed without prior court authorization is illegally 
obtained and must be suppressed as a matter of law. United States 
v. Chen, 979 F.2d 714, 716-19 (9th Cir. 1992). In Chen, "Camera 3" 
(monitoring activity outside a building, incidentally) was not 
authorized. The government itself acknowledged that evidence 
obtained from the camera was tainted and could not be used against 
the defendants. 
In this case, the Vernal City Police Department set up the 
video recorder without court authorization. Arguably, police were 
required, as a matter of law, to obtain authorization beforehand. 
This case admittedly involves state rather than federal action. 
However, the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies to state 
action under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 
S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) and Wolf v^ Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.E.2d 1782 (1949). The Defendant, in this 
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case, clearly was the object of a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. He consequently was entitled to but did not 
receive judicial protection, specifically in the form of police 
application to Eighth District Court for authorization to make use 
of a camera to monitor activities at his home. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS PEOPLE, NOT 
SIMPLY PLACES, WITHOUT REGARD TO PHYSICAL 
INTRUSION INTO AN ENCLOSURE. 
If in fact the action of the Vernal City Police Department was 
based on belief that activities at the Defendant's home were 
visible even to a casual observer, and therefore court authoriza-
tion for videotaping was unnecessary, such action is all the more 
egregious. The Fourth Amendment protects people rather than 
places. As the United States Supreme Court noted in a seminal case 
in this area of the law, "[T]he reach of [the Fourth Amendment] 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion 
into any given enclosure." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967). *[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people—and not 
simply 'areas1—against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. 
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
HELD THAT COURT AUTHORIZATION IS NECESSARY 
BEFORE VIDEO SURVEILLANCE MAY TAKE PLACE. 
United States v^ Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990) 
is instructive given the facts of this case. The United States 
Secret Service, suspecting conterfeiting, applied to federal 
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district court for authorization to install a closed circuit 
television camera inside a business. District court authorized 
installation* The defendants subsequently moved to suppress all 
video evidence in district court, which was denied. On appeal the 
defendants argued/ inter aliaF that the government's application 
for surveillance did not satisfy traditional Fourth Amendment 
requirements. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in response adopted five 
requirements for the government to satisfy before a court may 
authorize television surveillance. They were: (1) showing of 
probable cause/ (2) preparation of a court order particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized, 
(3) minimization of recording of activities not related to the 
crimes under investigation/ (4) failure or inapplicability of 
normal investigative procedures, and (5) preparation of a court 
order allowing surveillance only for as long as necessary, up to 
thirty days. Mesa-Rincon at 1437. The court noted that with the 
adoption of these requirements the Tenth Circuit was in substantial 
agreement with the Second Circuit in Biasucci, supra, the Seventh 
Circuit in Torres, supra, and the Fifth Circuit in Cuevas-Sanchez, 
supra. 
(Within the last several years the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted 
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virtually identical requirements. See United States v. Falls, 34 
F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 
536 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).) 
In this case, the police of course failed even to apply to the 
court for authorization to install a video recorder to record 
activities at the Defendant's home. This failure arguably is fatal 
to the case against the Defendant. 
IV. THE VERNAL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT CONDUCTED 
AN IMPERMISSIBLE GENERAL SEARCH, OUTSIDE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS. 
By failing to obtain court authorization, involving as it does 
limits on police action, the Vernal City Police Department in this 
case conducted what amounted to a general search of the Defendant. 
General searches, as a matter of law, are impermissible. See Chen 
at 717. 
Even more egregiously, police failed to recognize a 
fundamental principle of law: that with searches "[T]he 
Constitution requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of 
a judicial officer ... be imposed between the citizen and the 
police.•" Katz at 357, citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 481-82. "[SJearches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
The Defendant, in this case, never had the benefit of the 
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deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer, before 
installation of the video recorder. Police never bothered to bring 
themselves before a judge—for example, to show probable cause and 
assert how normal investigative procedures would fail or be 
inapplicable—and seek authorization for video surveillance. 
Police flagrantly disregarded the Defendant's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and arguably 
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution as well. 
V. ALL EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE TWO GARBAGE BAGS 
MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. POLICE SEIZED AND SEARCHED THE GARBAGE 
BAGS WITHOUT A WARRANT, AND WITHOUT 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
All videotape evidence obtained by the Vernal City Police 
Department must be suppressed, as a matter of law, because police 
did not obtain court authorization prior to installation of the 
video recorder. In addition, all evidence found in the two garbage 
bags which police, under the cover of darkness, confiscated from 
the Defendant's property must be suppressed. Police never observed 
the Defendant handling the bags before he picked them up out of the 
truck. Police never had any reason to believe that the bags 
contained inculpatory evidence; they simply were curious about 
possible contents. Police arguably entered the Defendant's 
property when taking the bags. This entry, and seizure and search 
of the bags, occurred without a warrant. In fact governmental 
9 
/AJ 
action took place even without probable cause. 
The government in this case may argue that the Defendant 
abandoned the garbage bags by placing them near the street, he did 
not retain a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in 
the property, and therefore police were entitled to seize and 
search the bags without a warrant. Such a view is supported by a 
seminal case in this area of the law, California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35 (1988). However, all states do not follow Greenwood. A 
number of states, for example, find that citizens enjoy greater 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures under state 
constitutions than the United States Constitution. The supreme 
court in both New Jersey and Washington have held that citizens in 
their states have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage as 
against all people except garbage collectors. Police may seize and 
search garbage only after it has been collected. State v. Hempele, 
120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990) and State v^ Boland, 115 Wash.2d 
571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). The Defendant believes that the view 
adopted by states such as New Jersey and Washington is more sound 
than that espoused in Greenwood. He urges the court to rule, as a 
matter of law, that Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
entitled him to a protected expectation of privacy in the garbage 
bags and police engaged in an illegal seizure and search of the 
bags, the results of which must be suppressed. 
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B* EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE GARBAGE BAGS IS 
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. 
Assuming that illegal governmental action has occurred, 
specifically videotaping of the Defendant and visitors at his home, 
the contents of the two garbage bags constitute derivative evidence 
which must be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. Evidence found in the bags is "fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
But for the presence of police while removing their video 
equipment, across the street from the Defendant's home, the 
Defendant never would have been observed taking the garbage bags 
from the truck to near the street. The Defendant of course 
acknowledges that any "but for" test is inapplicable in attenuation 
analysis, in accordance with Wong Sun, supra. However, the 
Defendant uses such language to emphasize the fact of temporal 
proximity between illegal governmental action (video equipment) and 
derivative evidence obtained (here, the garbage bags). The Utah 
Supreme Court, in a very recent case, identified temporal proximity 
as one of three factors to be utilized in attenuation analysis. 
See State v^ Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). 
In this case, police observed the Defendant handling the 
garbage bags at 6:45 p.m. They opted not to seize the bags until 
10:20 p.m. later that night, presumably so that they could make use 
of darkness and be undetected in their activity. Police, arguably, 
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would have seized the bags at the same time as they were in the 
home across the street, if they could have. In effect, there was 
no signficant period of time passing between when police were 
engaged in illegal activity and when they obtained the garbage 
bags. Evidence found in the bags cannot be purged of the taint of 
illegal governmental action, by reference to time. 
The other two attentuation analysis factors discussed in 
Shoulderblade are the purpose and flagrancy of police conduct, and 
the presence of intervening circumstances. In this case, as 
already stated, the action of the Vernal City Police Department in 
installing a video recorder without prior court authorization was 
egregious in the extreme. It represented a flagrant violation of 
the Defendant's federal and state constitutional rights. Also, no 
intervening circumstances existed which dissipate the taint of the 
videotaping on evidence found in the garbage bags. Attentuation 
analysis, as outlined in Shoulderblade, can lead only to the 
conclusion, in this case, that all evidence found in the garbage 
bags must be suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. 
V. ALL EVIDENCE POUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S HOME, 
AS THE RESULT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT, ALSO 
MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT IS FRUIT OF 
THE POISONOUS TREE. 
Police seized the garbage bags at 10:20 p.m. on October 22, 
1995. As a result of search of the bags, police then went the very 
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next day, October 23, 1995, and obtained a warrant to search the 
Defendant's home. Police promptly executed the warrant. Seized 
were numerous items of evidence in the home. 
All such evidence arguably must be suppressed, as a matter of 
law, because it constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree. It is 
tainted because it derives from illegal governmental action 
(videotaping of the Defendant, or in the alternative warrantless 
seizure and search of the garbage bags) or other illegally obtained 
fruit (evidence found in the bags). 
Attenuation analysis, pursuant to Shoulderblade, supports 
suppression. There was temporal proximity between the videotaping 
and the seizure and search of the garbage bags, on the one hand, 
and execution of the warrant and seizure of items in the 
Defendant's home, on the other hand. The underlying illegal 
governmental action was flagrant. There essentially were no 
intervening circumstances between the illegal governmental action 
and acquisition of evidence from the Defendant's home as a result 
of the warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule requires, in this case, 
that all evidence from the Defendant's home be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The suppression in effect of all evidence in this case, from 
police videotaping, from the two garbage bags and from the 
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Defendant's home, may well seem to be a drastic remedy. However, 
the full nature and extent of the government's illegal action—in 
particular its egregiousness and flagrancy—mandate this result. 
The government of course has an interest in successfully 
prosecuting individuals who have committed crimes. However, the 
government must use lawful means to achieve its objectives. Also, 
the integrity of the judiciary demands that courts constantly 
scrutinize governmental action and not become a party to 
governmental wrongdoing. Indeed an important function of the 
judiciary is to use tools at its disposal to deter future 
governmental illegalities. 
In this case, the Defendant urges the court to use the tool of 
suppression to send a clear message to the Vernal City Police 
Department, and other state agencies which blindly would follow in 
its footsteps, that videotaping of suspected criminal activity 
without prior court authorization is unconstitutional and all 
evidence derived from such videotaping, directly or indirectly, 
must be suppressed. 
DATED this *- day of September, 1996. 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney at Law 
14 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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On this — * day of September, 1996 I caused to be delivered 
a true and correct copy of this document to: 
JoAnn B. Stringham 
Uintah County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants Motion to Suppress. The 
Defendant first argues that the surveillance video tape of the Defendants home should be 
suppressed. The Court has read the cases sided by the Defendant and is not persuaded that the 
Defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy which would require a warrant. The cases 
cited by the Defendant are factually distinguishable in that they relate to situations where the 
recordings where of areas that whese not open to the public. In this case the police merely 
recorded on tape what was open to public view. The police certainly had a right to be in the 
place where the camera was set up. They could have stationed an officer at that location, 
where he or she could have observed the activities which took place at the Defendants home. 
The fact that a video recording was stationed at the location rather than a police officer; has no 
constitutional significance. The use of recording equipment merely relieves an officer from 
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the substantial time commitment which would have been involved in having an officer 
personally observe the Defendants home. The constitution does not protect as private what a 
citizen knowingly opens to public view. Based upon the above, the Motion to Suppress the 
videotape is denied. 
The Defendant next argues that the police improperly collected evidence from the 
garbage bag which he had placed in front of his home for collection. The Defendant correctly 
ekes California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), as controlling. Nevertheless, the 
Defendant argues that an analysis under Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution 
would lead to a different result than the result reached by the Supreme Court in Greenwood. 
For all practical purposes, the wording of Article 1, Section 14, and the 4th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, is identical. The Defendant cites two other 
states who, in interpreting there own constitution, have granted greater privledges to their 
citizens. The Defendant argues that the views adopted by these states, in interpreting their 
own constitution, is more sound than the views expressed in Greenwood. When the language 
of a State Constitution is substantially identical to the corresponding portion of the Federal 
Constitution and the Defendant requests the Court to read the State Constitution more broadly 
than the Federal Constitution; the Defendant must examine the historical basis which would 
require a different reading. As indicated, the Defendant cites two states which have granted 
citizens greater rights under their constitutions with respect to garbage left for collection. 
However, the Defendant argument seems to rest upon the conclusion that the United States 
/3i-
Supreme Court errored in deciding Greenwood. Unfortunately this court cannot presume that 
Greenwood was wrongly decided. Also, as noted by Justice Stewart in State v. Pool, 
871 P.2nd 531, the fact that a matter may have been wrongly decided, by itself, ../does not 
justify resorting to Article 1, Section 14 to achieve a different result". In this case, the 
arc* pi- $ 
Defendant merely urges the Court to exeept the analysts used by these courts as being more 
sound than the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court. No attempt was made to 
specifically examine our Constitution and provide a basis as to why the Utah Constitution 
should be read more broadly. Absent this type of inquiry, the Court is not persuaded to rule 
that our Constitution is broader than the Federal Constitution. 
In reaching the above conclusion the Court notes that there is no argument which has 
been placed before the Court which would indicate that this is an area of law where there are 
conflicting decisions of the United States Supreme Courts which are confusing to judges and 
4)iactiQnoro. -The decision in Greenwood applies to a narrow area of the law, it is clear, and 
easily applied. Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 3->tlav of October, 1996. 
A. Lynn Payne 
District Court Judge 
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MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
AND USE TRIAL DATE 
FOR YOUNGBLOOD HEARING 
Case No. 951800369 FS 
Judge Payne 
The Defendant, through counsel, respectfully moves the Court to continue the trial currently 
set in this matter for March 27 and 28, 1997 but make use of March 27, 1997 to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing regarding the actions of the Vernal City Police Department in destroying all 
evidence, except what it considered to be inculpatory evidence, contained in garbage bags seized from 
the Defendant's property on or about October 22,1995. Evidence allegedly contained in the garbage 
bags forms the one and only basis for Count I, possession of methamphetamine, enhanced to a first 
degree felony, and Count n, possession of cocaine, also enhanced to a first degree felony, in this case. 
It is proposed that the hearing be controlled by a line of cases including Arizona v. Young-
1 
fclflffiL 488 U.S. 51,109 S.Ct. 333 (1989) and United States v. Bohl. 25 F.3d 904 (10* Cir. 1994), 
dealing with the government's duty to preserve evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court 
would be asked to decide, in the unique facts and circumstances of this case, whether the Defendant's 
constitutional right to due process at trial has been affected so adversely by the actions of police that 
evidence in the garbage bags should be suppressed or in the alternative Counts I and II should be 
dismissed. 
The Defendant's motion is accompanied by a brief memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of the motion. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1997. 
\^\lrM* ' 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE QF DELIVERY 
7L 
On this ^ ^ day of February, 19971 caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of this 
document to: 
JoAnn B. Stringham 
Uintah County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
AND USE TRIAL DATE 
FOR YOUNGBLOOD HEARING 
Case No. 951800369 FS 
Judge Payne 
The Defendant, through counsel, submits the following memorandum in support of his motion 
to continue trial and use trial date for Youngblood hearing. 
I. THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS TIMELY. 
The Defendant acknowledges that his motion comes one month before scheduled trial. 
However, the State notified the Defendant, through counsel, only yesterday of the fact that members 
of the Vemal City Police Department had destroyed all evidence, except supposedly inculpatory 
evidence, contained in garbage bags seized from property. The Defendant's motion, therefore, is 
timely. 
a *> 
II. THE GARBAGE BAGS CONTAINED POTENTIALLY 
USEFUL EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
In this case, evidence allegedly contained in the garbage bags forms the one and only basis for 
Counts I and n. That is, because of some items allegedly found in the bags, the Defendant has been 
charged with possession of methamphetamine and possession of cocaine, both enhanced to first 
degree felonies. 
Arguably it was and still is critical to the Defendant's case to know as much as possible about 
each and every item that was in the bags. Among other things, such evidence is suggestive of when 
items were used or thrown away, the extent to which the Defendant can be associated with the items, 
and activities which individuals other than the Defendant engaged in. 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Lewis testified that the contents of the bags were 
inventoried. Tr. 11. However, the State has indicated to the Defendant, through counsel, that no 
inventory list even exists at this point in time. Also, mail allegedly found in the bags, Tr. 12, 
reportedly was destroyed along with all evidence not considered to be inculpatory. 
Because of the actions of police, the Defendant has been denied potentially useful evidence 
for his defense. 
ffl. THE DEFENDANT'S REMEDIES ARE SUPPRESSION 
OF EVIDENCE IN THE GARBAGE BAGS OR 
DISMISSAL OF COUNTS I AND II. 
Assuming that police now have violated the Defendant's right to due process at trial, because 
2 
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of destruction of evidence contained in the garbage bags, he arguably is entitled to suppression of 
evidence that police preserved or in the alternative to dismissal of Counts I and II. See, e.g. 
California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct 2528, 2533 (1984): "[W]hen evidence has been destroyed in 
violation of the Constitution, the court must choose between barring further prosecution or 
suppressing... the State's most probative evidence." 
DATED this * - ° day of February, 1997. 
W\i*-A 
WESLEY M.BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On this <-"t? day of February, 19971 caused to be delivered a true and correct copy of this 
document to: 
JoAnn B. Stringham 
Uintah County Attorney 
County Attorney's Office 
152 East 100 North 




1 RULE WHERE THESE OFFICERS NOW FEEL LIKE THEY HAVE TO GO IN, 
2 TAKE PICTURES OF EVERYTHING, INVENTORY EVERYTHING. THEY JUST 
3 CAN'T FUNCTION THAT WAY, YOUR HONOR. AND IT DOES OFFEND ME. 
4 IT OFFENDS ME THAT COUNSEL WOULD SAY THEY ACTED IN BAD FAITH. 
5 THEY DID WHAT THEY HAD TO DO. THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH IT. 
6 I DON'T EVEN THINK THEY SHOULD HAVE TO CHANGE THE PROCEDURE. 
7 MAYBE IN HINDSIGHT THEY COULD HAVE TAKEN SOME PICTURES WE 
8 COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS HEARING TODAY, BUT THAT'S THE ONLY 
9 REASON I COULD SEE IN CHANGING WHAT THEY DID. 
10 THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER FROM YOU? 
11 MR. BADEN: YOUR HONOR, I'LL SUBMIT THIS PARTICULAR 
12 MATTER. HOWEVER, I WILL VOLUNTEER IF THE COURT WISHES, TO 
13 BRIEF THE ISSUE AND ARGUE THE ISSUE FURTHER IN WRITING. BUT 
14 THAT OBVIOUSLY IS BY LEAVE OF THE COURT. 
15 MS. STRINGHAM: I HAVE NO --
16 THE COURT: I HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED THE MEMO FROM 
17 EACH OF YOU WITH RESPECT TO THESE ISSUES. I HAVE HAD AN 
18 OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE CASES. AND I AM PREPARED TO RULE. 
19 LET ME MAKE SOME FACTUAL FINDINGS. FIRST OF ALL, THE OFFICERS 
20 IN THIS CASE, OFFICERS LEWIS AND PARK, HAD OBSERVED THE 
21 DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE, MR. HOLDEN, PLACE TWO GARBAGE BAGS AT 
22 THE CURB ON OCTOBER THE 20TH, 1995. THOSE TWO BAGS WERE 
23 PICKED UP BY THE TWO OFFICERS PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO ON 
24 OCTOBER THE 23RD, 1995, AT ABOUT 10:20 P.M. THEY WENT TO THE 
25 VERNAL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, BEGAN PROCESSING THE BAGS ABOUT 
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1 10:30, AND BY 11:30 HAD COMPLETED THE PROCESS AND BOOKED THE 
2 ITEMS THAT THEY HAD RETAINED INTO EVIDENCE AND HAD DISPOSED OF 
3 THE REMAINING PARTS OF THE BAGS WHICH THEY DID NOT KEEP AND 
4 THE BAGS THEMSELVES. 
5 THE BAGS ARE DESCRIBED AS BEING TWO BAGS. ONE 
6 LARGER KITCHEN TYPE, WHICH WHEN FILLED WAS APPROXIMATELY --
7 AND I THINK THE POLICE OFFICER WAS LESS THAN CERTAIN ABOUT 
8 THIS MEASUREMENT -- BUT THE BEST DESCRIPTION HE COULD GIVE 
9 WOULD BE FROM TWO TO THREE FEET IN DIAMETER, AND THE SMALLER 
10 ONE WAS APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET IN DIAMETER. AND, AGAIN, I 
11 THINK THE POLICE OFFICER WAS LESS THAN CERTAIN HIMSELF IN 
12 GIVING THOSE MEASUREMENTS. BOTH WERE PRETTY FULL, HOWEVER. 
13 OFFICER PARK AND LEWIS WERE PRESENT WHEN THE ITEMS 
14 WERE OPEN. HOWEVER, OFFICERS TAYLOR AND ROOKS ASSISTED AT 
15 SOME POINT IN GOING THROUGH THE BAGS. AND THE ENTIRE 
16 PROGRESSION OF GOING THROUGH THE BAGS, AS I INDICATED, WAS 
17 COMPLETED WITHIN AN HOUR. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TO SEARCH FOR 
18 EVIDENCE OF NARCOTIC ACTIVITY AND SPECIFICALLY OF CRIMINAL 
19 CONDUCT. AS THEY WENT THROUGH, THEY SEPARATED THE ITEMS WHICH 
20 THEY BELIEVED TO HAVE USE AS EVIDENCE FROM ITEMS THAT THEY DID 
21 NOT THINK HAD USE AS EVIDENCE. 
22 THEY TOOK INTO CUSTODY USED SYRINGES, PORTIONS OF A 
23 STRAW, SOME APPARENTLY USED BINDLES, USED BAGGIES, ROLLING 
24 PAPER, AND PACKAGING FOR SYRINGES. OTHER MATERIAL WENT INTO 
25 THE TRASH. THE OFFICERS EACH MADE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT 
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1 DECISION AS TO WHAT THEY THOUGHT HAD EVIDENTIARY VALUE AS THEY 
2 WENT THROUGH THE GARBAGE. THERE IS NO POLICY OR PROCEDURE 
3 THAT WOULD HAVE ASSISTED THEM IN THAT PROCESS. THE POLICY AND 
4 PROCEDURE AS IT RELATES TO EVIDBNCE DEALS WITH PROCESSING OF 
5 EVIDENCE, NOT IN THE DECISION THAT AN OFFICER MAKES AS TO 
6 WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR ITEM IS EVIDENCE. THERE WAS 
7 NOTHING THAT WAS FOUND THERE THAT WAS EXCULPATORY OR HAD ANY 
8 INDICATION IT WAS EXCULPATORY. SO BRADY VERSUS MARYLAND ISN'T 
9 IMPLICATED. 
10 ITEMS THAT WERE THROWN AWAY INCLUDED EMPTY CANS, 
11 TOWELS, DISCARDED FOOD, AT LEAST TWO ENVELOPES WITH THE 
12 DEFENDANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS ON IT. NO PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN 
13 OF THE ITEMS WHICH WERE THROWN AWAY. NO INVENTORY WAS TAKEN 
14 OF THE ITEMS WHICH WERE THROWN AWAY. AND THEY WERE NOT 
15 PROCESSED IN ANY OTHER FASHION OTHER THAN AS PREVIOUSLY 
16 DESCRIBED. AND THAT WAS MERELY HAVING AN OFFICER GO THROUGH 
17 AND MAKE THE DECISION AS TO WHAT HAD EVIDENTIARY VALUE AND 
18 WHAT DID NOT. THE TRASH WAS WET, STINKY, HAD FOOD IN IT. 
19 OFFICER LEWIS BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A GOOD MEMORY ABOUT THE 
20 TYPE OF ITEMS; I THINK HE DOES, BUT NOT THE EXACT NUMBER AND 
21 QUANTITY OF ITEMS. I BELIEVE THAT OFFICER PARK HAS A MEMORY 
22 THAT'S NOT AS GOOD WHEN IT COMES TO THOSE THINGS. 
23 WITH RESPECT TO THE TWO ENVELOPES THAT WERE THERE, 
24 THERE WAS NO ABILITY AT THIS POINT TO TESTIFY AS TO WHO THE ' 
25 SENDER WAS, AS TO WHETHER THE POSTMARK WAS OF A PARTICULAR 
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1 DATE. AND THERE IS NO INFORMATION WHICH THE OFFICERS TOOK AS 
2 TO THE CONTENTS OF THE WRITING. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE 
3 GARBAGE BAGS WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY ANYONE ELSE BESIDES THE 
4 DEFENDANT. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO LOOK FOR PRODUCT DATES OR 
5 TO PROCESS FOR FINGERPRINTS. 
6 I BELIEVE THAT OFFICER LEWIS IS ABLE TODAY TO GIVE 
7 AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL CONTENTS OF THE BAGS. 
8 THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THEY HAD ACTUALLY TAKEN SOMETHING 
9 LIKE A GARBAGE BAG AND BROUGHT IT TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND 
10 PROCESSED IT AT THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. AND THE STATE ARGUES 
11 THAT THIS IS KIND OF LIKE A SEARCH WARRANT. BUT, 
12 FUNDAMENTALLY, IT ISN'T KIND OF LIKE A SEARCH WARRANT, BECAUSE 
13 IN THE CASE OF A SEARCH WARRANT, THE OFFICERS MAY GO THROUGH 
14 THE GARBAGE AT SOMEBODY'S HOME AND TAKE THINGS OUT, BUT THEY 
15 LEAVE THE GARBAGE. IN THIS CASE THEY TOOK THE GARBAGE AND 
16 MADE IT SO IT WASN'T AVAILABLE TO ANYBODY ELSE. SO I THINK 
17 THAT THAT'S A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT WE TALKED 
18 ABOUT IN SEARCHING SITUATIONS. 
19 I BELIEVE I HAVE INDICATED THERE WAS NOTHING IN 
20 THERE TO CONNECT ANYBODY ELSE BESIDES MR. HOLDEN WITH THE BAG. 
21 I THINK I HAVE ALREADY STATED THAT. 
22 ARE THERE ANY OTHER FACTUAL ISSUES YOU WANT ME TO 
23 DEAL WITH THAT I HAVEN'T DEALT WITH? THOSE ARB MY FINDINGS OF 
24 FACT IN THIS CASE. 
25 MS. STRINGHAM: I CAN'T THINK OF ANY. WELL, SAY 
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1 THERE WAS NOTHING IN THERE TO IDENTIFY ANYONE OTHER THAN THE 
2 DEFENDANT, I ALSO THINK THAT THE OFFICERS TESTIFIED THEY 
3 DIDN'T SEE ANYTHING THAT THEY THOUGHT COULD BE POTENTIALLY 
4 USEFUL. 
5 THE COURT: THERE IS NO BRADY. THAT'S TRUE. I 
6 THOUGHT I HAD SAID THAT. THERE WASN'T ANYTHING THAT WOULD 
7 INDICATE THE OFFICERS SAW ANYTHING IN THE BAG WHICH WOULD BE 
8 USEFUL TO THE DEFENSE, WHICH I THINK IS THE BRADY ISSUE, THE 
9 EXCULPATORY INFORMATION. THERE WAS NOTHING EXCULPATORY THAT 
10 THE OFFICERS OBSERVED IN THE BAG. 
11 THE TWO CASES THAT YOU TALKED ABOUT, THE FIRST 
12 CASE, CALIFORNIA VERSUS TROMBETTA, TALKED ABOUT SOME OF THE 
13 PROBLEMS THAT ARE INHERENT IN THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS. AND IN 
14 THAT CASE THEY TALKED ABOUT THE DUTY COMING IN TO EFFECT WHEN 
15 THE EVIDENCE MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN 
16 THE SUSPECT'S DEFENSE TO GIVE IT CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS. 
17 IN THIS CASE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WERE ITEMS 
18 THAT HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED WHICH WERE THROWN AWAY DID NOT 
19 POSSESS AN EXCULPATORY VALUE THAT WAS APPARENT TO THE POLICE 
20 OFFICER, FOR THE ITEMS WERE DESTROYED. THEREFORE, THE 
21 ANALYSIS IN CALIFORNIA VERSUS TROMBETTA IS NOT MET. 
22 THE COURT NOTES THAT THE MERE POSSIBILITY THAT LOST 
23 OR DESTROYED EVIDENCE COULD BE EXCULPATORY IS NOT SUFFICIENT 
24 TO SATISFY THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS. MERE NEGLIGENCE 
25 IS NOT SUFFICIENT. SO WE NEED TO LOOK AT YOUNGBLOOD. IN THAT 
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1 SITUATION, THEY WERE LOOKING AT THE EVIDENCE WHICH ALL THAT 
2 COULD BE SAID IS THAT THE EVIDENCE MAY HAVE BEEN POTENTIALLY 
3 USEFUL FOR THE DEFENSE. AND I THINK THAT THAT'S THE ANALYSIS 
4 THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO FOCUS ON BECAUSE I THINK THAT THAT'S 
5 THE BEST THAT CAN BE SAID HERE. WE ARE DEALING WITH A 
6 SITUATION WHERE WE DON'T KNOW ANY MORE THAN I HAVE JUST SAID. 
7 THAT IS, WE DON'T KNOW THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT WAS 
8 EXCULPATORY. INDEED, AS MR. BADEN HAS INDICATED, IT SEEMS 
9 THAT THE ONLY RELEVANT ITEMS THAT WERE THERE WERE THE LETTERS. 
10 AND THEY CERTAINLY HAVE INCRIMINATING ASPECTS TO THEM. AS TO 
11 WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE EXCULPATORY OR MAY HAVE BEEN USEFUL, 
12 WE DON'T KNOW THAT. I THINK THAT THAT'S THE YOUNGBLOOD 
13 ANALYSIS. AND IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A BURDEN UNDER 
14 YOUNGBLOOD, BAD FAITH NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED. 
15 THE DEFENSE HAS TALKED ABOUT SEVERAL ISSUES WITH 
16 RESPECT TO BAD FAITH. FIRST OF ALL, THAT THERE WAS NO 
17 CONSULTATION WITH A SUPERVISOR. AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE 
18 BEFORE THE COURT THAT THAT'S REQUIRED BY POLICY OR THAT THAT 
19 IS INDEED WHAT HAPPENS IN PRACTICE. AND MY EXPERIENCE LEADS 
20 ME TO BELIEVE THAT POLICE OFFICERS INDIVIDUALLY MAKE THAT 
21 DECISION AS THEY PROCESS. THEY DON'T GO TO THEIR SUPERIORS 
22 BEFORE THEY MAKE A DECISION TO GATHER EVIDENCE. EVIDENCE IS 
23 GATHERED EVERY NIGHT ON THE STREET BY POLICE OFFICERS WITHOUT 
24 ANY CONSULTATION OF SUPERIORS. NOW, I AM NOT REALLY GOING TO 
25 RELY UPON MY EXPERIENCE HERE. I AM JUST SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH 
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1 THE DEFENDANT ARGUES THAT THERE WAS NO CONSULTATION WITH 
2 SUPERIORS, THEY NEED TO HAVE TO MEET THAT ARGUMENT, OR TO GIVE 
3 THAT ARGUMENT WEIGHT THEY NEED TO HAVE SHOWN THAT THAT'S WHAT 
4 THE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE DONE. AND THEY HAVE NOT PRODUCED ANY 
5 EVIDENCE THAT WOULD INDICATE THE OFFICERS SHOULD HAVE DONE 
6 THAT OR IT WAS A POLICY OR IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRUDENT UNDER 
7 THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OR THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE ACTING IN A 
8 WAY WHICH WAS EVEN NEGLIGENT. IN FAILING TO DO THAT THERE 
9 JUST ISN'T ANY EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
10 AND, THEY POINT, THERE IS NO DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE 
11 OFFICERS. AND I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL TO 
12 THE PROCESS. AND I FIND THAT IT'S NOT HELPFUL TO THE ANALYSIS 
13 FOR THE SAME REASONS I HAVE JUST GIVEN. AND THAT IS THAT 
14 THERE IS NO INDICATION IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE POLICE OFFICERS 
15 TO INDEPENDENTLY MAKE DECISIONS AS TO WHAT EVIDENCE WAS AND 
16 WHAT IT WAS NOT. AND THEY ARGUED THAT THE OFFICERS MADE NO 
17 REFERENCE TO THE POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL. AND THERE IS, 
18 AGAIN, NO EVIDENCE THAT IF THEY WOULD HAVE LOOKED TO THE 
19 POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN GUIDED 
20 AND DIRECTED WITH RESPECT TO THE CERTAIN ISSUE OF MAKING A 
21 DECISION AS TO WHICH POTENTIAL ITEMS ARE EVIDENCE AND WHICH 
22 ARE NOT. SO ALL OF THOSE HAVE NO WEIGHT, IN MY OPINION, AS TO 
23 THIS ANALYSIS. 
24 THEY HAVE TALKED ABOUT OPPORTUNITY. AND, OF 
25 COURSE, OPPORTUNITY, THAT'S THE REASON WE ARE HERE. IF THE 
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1 FACT WAS NOT THE POLICE OFFICERS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
2 PRESERVE THE EVIDENCE, WE WOULD NOT BE HERE. BECAUSE IF 
3 POLICE OFFICERS DIDN'T HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY THEY WOULDN'T BE 
4 IN THIS SITUATION. SO THE MERE FACT THAT POLICE OFFICERS HAVE 
5 OPPORTUNITY IS NOT, I DON'T THINK, EXTREMELY USEFUL IN THE 
6 ANALYSIS. ONE CAN ALWAYS ARGUE THAT PHOTOS COULD HAVE BEEN 
7 TAKEN OR AN INVENTORY COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR EVEN THAT IF 
8 THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ENOUGH CASE IN THE EYES OF THE POLICE 
9 THAT THE ENTIRE GARBAGE COULD HAVE BEEN PRESERVED, 
10 REFRIDGERATED, FROZEN. IT'S ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO DO MORE. IT'S 
11 ALWAYS POSSIBLE TO DO FINGERPRINTS. 
12 I DON'T THINK THAT THE MERE POSSIBILITY IS THE 
13 ANALYSIS. I THINK THE COURT NEEDS TO FOCUS ON WHAT THE 
14 EVIDENCE SHOWS IN THIS CASE. AS I INDICATED, WE DON'T KNOW 
15 WHAT THE VALUE OF THOSE ITEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN. AND THAT'S WHY 
16 WE NEED TO FOCUS ON BAD FAITH. BUT I THINK IN TALKING ABOUT 
17 BAD FAITH, IT IS NOT VERY HELPFUL TO TALK ABOUT THOSE ISSUES, 
18 MERE OPPORTUNITY. IT'S APPARENT TO ME THAT OFFICERS DID NOT 
19 RECOGNIZE ANY OF THESE ITEMS AS BEING USEFUL IN THIS CASE. I 
20 THINK THEY MADE A MISTAKE WHEN THEY THREW AWAY THE ENVELOPES. 
21 I THINK THAT THAT CERTAINLY HAD USB FOR THE PROSECUTION IN 
22 ESTABLISHING A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND THE 
23 GARBAGE BAGS. THEY MADB THAT DECISION. THEY WILL HAVE TO 
24 SUFFER IN THAT DECISION. BUT THERE CERTAINLY IS NO INDICATION 
25 OF BAD FAITH HERE, NOR CAN BE SAID HERE THAN THE CONTENTS 
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1 COULD HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO FURTHER TEST AND EVALUATION. WE 
2 DON'T KNOW WHAT THE RESULTS OF THE TEST MIGHT HAVE BEEN, 
3 WHETHER OR NOT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXONERATED OR INCRIMINATED 
4 THE DEFENDANT. THE ONLY NEGLIGENCE I CAN FIND IS WITH RESPECT 
5 TO THE HANDLING OF THE WRITTEN MATERIAL. AND I DO NOT BELIEVE 
6 THAT THAT ARISES OR EVEN APPROACHES BAD FAITH. AS I HAVE 
7 INDICATED, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT OTHER THAN THE 
8 ENVELOPES THAT THIS WOULD HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN 
9 THIS MATTER. 
10 AND WITH RESPECT TO THE ENVELOPES THERE IS NO 
11 INDICATION IT WOULD HAVE PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THEIR 
12 DEFENSE. IF ANYTHING, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE PROSECUTION'S 
13 ADVANTAGE TO PRESERVE THE ENVELOPES. AND THE VERY FACT THAT 
14 THEY ARE THROWING AWAY THE ENVELOPES WHICH ARE USEFUL TO THE 
15 PROSECUTION, WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE USEFUL TO THE PROSECUTION 
16 BECAUSE IT WOULD ESTABLISH THE DEFENDANT. WE DON'T KNOW IF IT 
17 WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE DEFENSE INDICATES THAT THEY WERE NOT 
18 PROCEEDING IN BAD FAITH. AND SO THE MOTION IS DENIED. 
19 AGAIN, AND FOR THE RECORD, SO IT'S IN THE RECORD, 
20 THE MOTION WAS TO CONDUCT A "YOUNGBLOOD" HEARING, CITE THE 
21 FEDERAL CASES. IN THE FEDERAL CASES CITED TO UNITED STATES 
22 CONSTITUTION THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO UTAH CONSTITUTION. THE 
23 COURT WILL NOT, ON ITS OWN, UNDERTAKE AN EVALUATION AND 
24 ANALYSIS WITHOUT THE REQUIREMENT THE SUPREME COURT HAS PLACED 
25 UPON COUNSEL TO DO THE THINGS THAT I HAVE TALKED ABOUT 
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